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1 Introduction 
Recent years have seen a flourish of interest in the
BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South
Africa) economies and their growing role as
producers and intermediate powers in the global
economy (Humphrey and Messner in this IDS
Bulletin). Although often considered as a group
(with Russia excluded from the BICS grouping),
China and India on the one hand, and Brazil and
South Africa on the other, represent different
trajectories. The former, the Asian Drivers, are
characterised by great economic dynamism, while
Brazil and South Africa are facing uncertain
economic prospects.
In this article, limited in depth by length
constraints, we focus on the respective trajectories
of Brazil and China, and the growing direct and
indirect consequences for Brazil of China’s rapid
growth. We begin in Section 2 with an analysis of
relative economic performance, and then in
Section 3 we discuss the nature of their inter-
relationship and the implications this has for Brazil.
This involves consideration both of trade impacts
(Asian Driver 1 in the Schmitz taxonomy, this IDS
Bulletin) and the reorganisation of production
networks at world level (Asian Driver 2 in the
Schmitz taxonomy, this IDS Bulletin). In the final
section, some preliminary assessments and
inferences are made, indicating themes and
approaches that should be better studied for an
improved understanding of the dynamics of the
BRIC/BICS economies.
2 Brazil and China compared
2.1 Overall indicators of development
Historically, comparative analyses of the evolution
of the Brazilian industry vis-à-vis Asian countries
have not been consistent because the Asian reference
seems to change as time goes on. In the 1970s and
1980s, South Korea used to be the Asian
counterpart. Although Korea is a smaller country
and its industrialisation process was initiated some
years after that of Brazil, there was a period where
similarities in terms of industrial development and
structure were quite strong (Goldenstein 1994;
Fleury and Fleury 1995). Korea, however, has now
moved into “the big league” and these comparisons
are seldom pursued. Instead, it is with China and
India that the comparison is made.
Currently, Brazil’s gross national product (GNP)
(US$605bn) is of the same order of magnitude as that
of Korea (US$696bn) and India (US$686bn).
Populations differ in these three countries however,
and Korea’s GNP per capita is three times higher than
that of Brazil which, in turn, is four times larger than
India’s. China’s GNP is currently twice the size of these
three economies (US$1,460bn) and GNP per capita is
somewhere between that of Brazil and India. But what
is striking is that from 1990 to 2003, the Chinese and
the Indian economies grew five and two and a half
times more than the Brazilian economy (around 11
per cent, 5 per cent and 2 per cent yearly), respectively.
Those figures indicate the relative difference in
the dynamism of three of the participants of the
BRIC/BICS: even if the whole group is referred as
the “moving whales”, their relative speed seems to
have been quite different in the recent past.
2.2 The presence of multinationals in the
Brazilian industry
The acceleration of the industrialisation process
that is currently observed in China and India might
be considered similar to the one that took place in
Brazil during the 1950s and 1960s. But, unlike
China and India who have seen sustained growth
in recent decades, during the second half of the
twentieth century, industry in Brazil grew through
discontinuous cycles of prosperity and depression. 
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Brazilian industrial growth was heavily dependent
on multinational enterprises (MNEs). And, for the
purposes of this study, it is relevant to point out that
the vast majority of the MNEs which, in different
moments of its industrialisation process, established
a leading role in the Brazilian economy: in automotive
and metal-mechanics during the 1950s and 1960s,
in chemicals during the 1970s, in computing during
the 1980s, in telecommunications and automobiles
during the 1990s, and have recently established a
strong foothold in China.
In the 1980s, the subsidiaries of MNEs were
concentrated in the most dynamic industrial sectors,
accounting for 26 per cent of manufactured value
added and 20 per cent of total manufacturing
employment (Zockun 1987). In the 1990s, after
the opening of the local markets, the weight of the
subsidiaries of MNEs increased. Ferraz et al. (1999),
in an article focusing on the economic and structural
changes in the Brazilian economy, it was observed
that those ‘well placed to implement these strategies
[the ones needed to cope with the changes] were
foreign firms operating in sectors associated with
the expansion of final demand’. On top of that, the
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Table 1: Growth of Brazilian and world markets
1973–83 1983–93 1993–2003
World (measured by global exports) 12.22 7.18 6.13
Brazil (measured by GNP) 4.21 2.78 2.67
Source: Frischtak (2004: 3).
Figure 1: Growth of manufacturing industries
World
Developing
countries
South and
South-East
Asian countries
Latin America
and Caribbean
Brazil
1981–91 1991–6 1996–2001
Source: Frischtak (2004: 4).
privatisation process that took place in the same
period augmented the relative importance of MNEs
in the Brazilian economy.
As a consequence, Brazil’s presence in
international markets has been driven by the exports
of MNEs. Of the total value of exports by the 76
Brazilian firms ranked among the 200 largest, 64
per cent originated from subsidiaries of MNEs, 30
per cent from locally owned private enterprises and
6 per cent from state-owned enterprises (America
Economia, 16 August: 84). Therefore, as we will
show, MNE global sourcing decisions and intra-firm
trade play an extremely important role in the direct
and indirect impact of China’s growth on Brazil.
2.3 Indicators related to competitiveness
of industry in world markets
Until the early 1990s, the Brazilian market was
relatively closed and domestic industry was heavily
protected. After trade liberalisation, and contrary
to expectations, not only did the growth rate not
pick up, but the internal market grew much more
slowly than the rest of the world (Table 1). Moreover,
the growth of the Brazilian manufacturing industry
was slower than most of the remaining regions;
Latin America among them (Figure 1).
A third characteristic of Brazil’s growth has been
that the export orientation of the industry did not
change after the opening to the world markets. Veiga
(2000) observes a continued absence of dynamism
with little change in the structure of exports during
the 1990s. He compared Brazilian exports to the
US and to the rest of the world. In the US, consumer
demand reflected a much higher pattern of
technological intensity than in the demand structure
of the rest of the world. Yet, there were no significant
differences in the technological content of exports
to these two distinct markets, suggesting an absence
of structural dynamism in the Brazilian economy.
In 2004, Frischtak corroborated these conclusions
about the absence of dynamism in Brazilian exports
and the continued dependence on the domestic
market (Frischtak 2004).
As a consequence, Brazil’s participation in
international markets is still limited, particularly by
comparison with China (Table 2). Even though the
absolute value of Brazil’s exports has risen
substantially since 2000, this has had little impact
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Table 2: Participation of Brazil and China in the world market (%)
Brazil China
Year Exports Imports Exports Imports
1990 0.91 0.63 1.49 1.50
1995 0.91 1.03 2.50 2.53
2000 0.86 0.89 3.91 3.43
2001 0.95 0.92 4.34 3.84
2002 0.94 0.75 5.07 4.49
2003 0.98 0.66 5.86 5.39
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade and Statistics Yearbook 2004 (accessed 15 August 2005).
Table 3: Brazilian imports from OECD countries
Year 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003
Percentage 57.18 65.07 62.50 64.52 63.16 60.09
Source: Data from: The Secretary of International Trade (SECEX); MDIC, Brazilian Ministry for Industry and
Trade, SECEX: www.desenvolvimento.gov.br/sitio/secex/depPlaDesComExterior/indEstatisticas/aliWeb.php
(accessed 15 August 2005) [elaborated by the authors].
on its share of global trade. By contrast, China’s share
of both global exports and imports has risen markedly.
A feature of China’s rapid export growth has been
its participation in regional value chains (Lall and
Albaladejo 2004; Evans et al. in this IDS Bulletin)
leveraged by the increasing number of regional trade
agreements. This is reflected in the
disproportionately large growth in China’s imports
from other developing economies; in 1978, 70 per
cent of its imports originated from industrialised
countries, while in 2001, that proportion fell to 49
per cent (Barros 2004: 18). Brazil shows a stable
pattern with almost two-thirds of imports originating
from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) economies (Table 3).
There are a variety of explanations for this,
including the absence of what Evans et al. in this
IDS Bulletin refer to as “deep integration” – that is,
regional value chains. The difficulties experienced
in the effective implementation and functioning of
Mercosur, the default of the FTAA (Free Trade Area
of the Americas) and the orientation of Lula’s
government prioritising the creation of South-South
trade blocks, which face political and economic
obstacles, left Brazil in an isolated position.
2.4 Indicators related to the attractiveness
of each country in terms of FDI
In 1990, foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows
were valued at US$990m into Brazil, US$780m into
India and US$3.5bn into China. During the 1990s,
the annual average was in the range of US$10.5bn
for Brazil, US$1.7bn for India and US$28.0bn for
China. For the period 2000–03, those figures rose
to US$20.5bn for Brazil, US$4.8bn for India and
US$44.0bn for China. It is unclear whether these
large flows to China were at the cost of other
developing counties such as Brazil but recently the
Bank of Spain estimated that ‘for each US$1.00
invested in China, US$0.16 is not invested in Latin
America’ (Valor 03, August 2005: A9). According to
the study, Mexico and Colombia would be the most
directly affected countries and Brazil would be only
lightly harmed. However, in order to understand
this diversion in flows, particularly in the future,
they need to be assessed in relation to the locational
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Figure 2: Bilateral trade balance Brazil–China (US$m)
1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Source: MDIC, Brazilian Ministry for Industry and Trade, SECEX: www.desenvolvimento.gov.br/sitio/secex/
depPlaDesComExterior/indEstatisticas/aliWeb.php (accessed 23 August 2005).
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and sourcing decisions of MNEs. This point will be
addressed below.
3 Brazil and China: participation in
the world markets 
3.1 Asian Drivers 1: changes in the
quantity and direction of trade
Bilateral trade between Brazil and China has
increased substantially in the last decade. Between
1996 and 2003, exports from Brazil to China grew
four-fold and between 2000 and 2003, China
moved from the twelfth to the fourth position
among the countries to which Brazil exports. Brazil’s
market share in the Chinese market increased from
0.43 per cent in 2000 to 1.27 per cent in 2003.
However Brazilian imports from China are growing
at an even faster rate and the trade balance which,
until 2003, presented a positive result for Brazil, is
being rapidly reversed (Figure 2). There is already
a clear trend favouring China and a deficit in trade
is expected for 2006.
It is not just the rate of growth of this bilateral
trade that shows asymmetries, but also its
composition. Brazil exports basic commodities and
natural resources-intensive products: coal, grains
(soy), steel and associated products and meat
(poultry and swine). Brazil’s exports of manufactured
and semi-manufactured products accounted for
only 5.5 per cent of its exports to China.
In a recent study, Negri (2005: 24) observes that
‘considering manufacturing industry only, [Brazil’s]
exports to China presents a lower technological level
than the exports for the rest of the world’. The
implications of this are severe when we bear in mind
our observation of the lack of dynamism of Brazilian
exports to the rest of the world. By contrast, Brazil
largely imports manufactured goods from China.
The main imports are related to electronics
components, telecommunications (especially cell
phones and liquid crystal displays), textile, shoes,
toys, tyres and components for motorcycles and
bicycles. In our view, the predominant explanation
for this structure of bilateral aid is explained in
relation to the strategies and configurations of MNEs.
In summary, the major export opportunities from
Brazil to China appear to be in the areas of
commodities. It is widely believed in Brazil that the
impressive growth of China, as well as other Asian
countries, which are poor in terms of natural
resources create opportunities for countries with a
complementary profile, such as Brazil. This is not
without its dangers, however. The increase in exports
of basic commodities produces an appreciation of
the local currency that creates obstacles for the
simultaneous growth of manufactured products.
3.2 Asian Drivers 2: the globalisation of
value chains
The accelerated development process of the large
Asian countries and their incorporation in global
value chains has both direct and indirect effects
upon Brazilian industry. The direct effects are
associated with direct relationships in terms of trade
and mutual influences in their industrial structures
through cooperation and competition. The indirect
effects involve third parties: the strategies of MNEs
in their global sourcing and locational decisions.
The indirect impacts
Relocation of production
The relocation of production is the most visible
feature of the entry of China in the global markets
due to a generalised adoption of offshoring strategies.
More than Brazil, Mexico was deeply affected by
this, with about 600,000 jobs being transferred
from the Mexican maquiladoras to Chinese suppliers.
There are no figures available for the case of Brazil
but it is well known that many individual MNEs
switched production from Brazil to China. The auto
industry is a case in point. After the significant
investment that was made in Brazil in the second
half of the 1990s to modernise existing plants and
in the establishment of new plants (many designed
around radically new concepts), there is clear
evidence of an almost complete inflection towards
the Asian markets in the new millennium. 
But this is also evident in the case of the electronics
sector. Philips, the European producer of electronic
products has been operating in Brazil for almost a
century. Its most recent strategy emanating from
Europe was to close Brazilian plants and to source
for the domestic market from China. Only the active
resistance of local managers succeeded in reversing
that trend. It is not clear how many other MNEs
have made similar decisions which have not been
publicised as widely as the case of Philips.
Dislocation of production
The entry of new Asian enterprises into high-scale,
low-priced, basic products has forced many MNEs
to abandon commodity segments and to specialise
in more complex products. This has created challenges
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for their operations in developing countries such as
Brazil, where many of their subsidiaries produced
commodity products. Should these subsidiaries be
upgraded in line with their global restructuring?
Should they continue to produce commodities locally,
given that these were products discontinued
elsewhere? In an earlier study (Fleury and Fleury
2001), we focused on the textile production chains
based on chemical fibres. In the early 1990s, new
large integrated Chinese producers of commodity
fibres forced MNEs such as BASF, Dow, Rhone and
Poulenc to alter their specialisations. Gradually, these
MNEs changed the profile of their subsidiaries in
Brazil moving towards specialities, highly value-added
products, and mostly abandoning the plants dedicated
to commodity fibres. Some of those plants were sold
very cheap to local groups but, overall, the quantity
and variety of local supply was reduced and
consequently imports increased significantly.
Sourcing
The third indirect effect could be called “Asian
sourcing”. It concerns the possibilities opened for
subsidiaries of MNEs established in Brazil to source
from China, either directly or indirectly, thus
changing the structures of the local supply chains.
Unilever is a case in point: inputs that were formerly
purchased in Brazil are now imported from Asia,
especially China, in larger quantities. A slightly
different arrangement can be observed in the
telecommunications industry. Large global
manufacturing and services providers, the so-called
“manufacturing contractors”, were established
during the 1990s (Sturgeon 1997). When
subsidiaries of manufacturing contractors were
installed in Brazil, the subsidiaries of specialised
equipment suppliers, such as Ericsson, NEC,
Motorola, among others, began subcontracting from
them. However, these manufacturing contractors
act on a global scale and now source parts and
components from Asia (Fleury and Fleury 2004).
In both cases, the configurations of the local supply
chains were substantially altered and local suppliers
were urged to redefine their strategies.
The direct impacts
The direct impacts relate to changes in the structure
of the industry and positioning in global value chains
as a consequence of bilateral investments between
the two economies. In this case, it is necessary to
analyse the process of internationalisation of Chinese
and Brazilian enterprises.
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Empresa Brasileira de Compressores (Embraco) is the world’s largest producer of hermetic
compressors, with a global market share of 25 per cent. Its second foreign plant was installed in China
in 1995 under a joint venture with Chinese Snowflake (Embraco owns 56 per cent of the equity,
Snowflake holds 40 per cent and Whirlpool of the US has 4 per cent). 
The Chinese plant has the capacity to produce 2.2 million units/year and employs 1,200 persons.
The plant has a local R&D staff of 52 and maintains a strong relationship with its Brazilian
headquarters for the development of products appropriate for the local markets.
Box 2: Embraco and the manufacture of compressors
Companhia Vale do Rio Doce (CVRD) is the largest mining company of the Americas and the fourth
largest world producer. It began exporting to China in 1973, initially through its Hong Kong
representative office. China is currently its largest external market. 
In 2002, CVRD established a new office in Shanghai. CVRD has a close relationship with the
Chinese steelmaker Bao Steel. Bao’s latest plant in China was designed in Japan to operate according
to the specifications of Brazilian raw materials. Simultaneously, a new joint project aiming to install a
new large operation of Bao Steel in the North of Brazil is being developed. That new plant is expected
to be fully operational until the end of the current decade.
In addition, CVRD also has two joint ventures in China: Henan Longyu Energy Resource and
Shangdong Yukuang International Coking Company. 
Box 1: CVRD and the creation of joint projects
Brazilian enterprises producing abroad and in
China
Towards the end of the twentieth century, the
internationalisation of Brazilian enterprises gained
rhythm and consistency. Acquisitions of firms and
the establishment of new plants, both in advanced
and in developing countries, became part of their
competitive strategies. The late internationalisation
of Brazilian enterprises has been due to four main
factors: (a) the geographic dimension: Brazil (like
the other BRICs) is a very large country and has a
large internal market; (b) the lack of governmental
stimulus (in contrast to Korea); (c) the protected
domestic market until the early 1990s reduced the
incentive to target external markets; and (d) cultural
distance from other countries (Barretto and Rocha
2003). Table 4, shows the year in which the Brazilian
companies initiated their process of
internationalisation. Until 1992, only three of them
had foreign factories (a total of five sites), all of them
in neighbouring countries. From 1992 on, an
increasing number of companies started international
manufacturing. The majority of foreign factories
were acquisitions (“brownfield” sites accounted for
80 per cent), a very small percentage were newly
built “greenfield” factories (3 per cent) and joint
ventures represented the remaining 17 per cent.
The year 1991 was the year of the opening to
the international markets through the substantial
reduction of tariffs. Thus, the first movers might
have been influenced by trade liberalisation.
Thereafter, the increase in the number of firms
investing abroad between 1995 and 2001 seems to
be related to two important moments in the Brazilian
economy: the first, the stabilisation of currency
after a long period of high levels of inflation and
the second, the devaluation of the Brazilian currency
in the 2001 global crisis. Access to financial
resources in international markets and the
circumvention of tariff and technical barriers seem
to be the key factors for decision making at firm
level. The need to guarantee at least part of the
turnover in a strong currency (hedging) might be
considered one of the most important drivers for
the internationalisation of the Brazilian firms. 
Beyond South America, these plants are located
in a variety of countries: 17 in the US, eight in
Europe, one in South Africa and six in China. This
indicates that the internationalisation of Brazilian
firms is basically market-seeking. Where Asia is
concerned, China is the primary target for Brazilian
enterprises. The Brazilian Embassy in Beijing reports
that there are around 40 joint venture agreements
of Brazilian enterprises in China, ranging from banks
and commercial firms to large and medium Brazilian
industrial firms. Of the 20 largest Brazilian MNEs,
six have installed production plants in China. Three
of these were the object of field research: Companhia
Vale do Rio Doce (CVRD, Box 1), Embraco (Box 2)
and Embraer (Box 3). Each of these manufacturing
investments began with the earlier growth of exports
to China, followed by the establishment of a
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Table 4: Evolution of new starters and number of new plants
Year Pre-1992 1992–4 1995–7 1998–2000 2001–03 2004 Total
Brazilian firms investing 3 3 6 2 5 1 20
abroad
Number of foreign plants 5 9 12 25 26 12 89
Empresa Brasileira de Aeron·utica (Embraer) is one of the world’s leading manufacturers of regional jets.
Seeing the prospect of a rapidly growing market in China and operating in a very competitive global
sector, Embraer established a commercial office in Beijing in 2000.
In 2003 it signed a joint venture agreement with Hafei (controlled by the China Aviation Industry
Corporation) to assemble the 45-seat jet aircraft in Harbin. The Hafei operation was remodelled and
currently receives components in kit form from Brazil. The aircraft are assembled by a staff of around
180 people.
Box 3: Embraer and the assembly of aircraft
commercial office and only subsequently two of
them installed physical plants.
Which factors determine successful operation
in the Chinese market? Looking from the
perspective of distinctive competences, it is evident
that besides the intrinsic qualities of the raw material
extracted in Brazil, it is CVRD’s competence in
operations management (and especially logistics)
that provides its competitive advantage in China.
In the case of Embraco, technological competences
(capacity to design and implement new types of
product) and operations management competences
(capacity to manufacture abroad to international
standards of quality and costs) provides them with
access to the Chinese market. Finally, in the case
of Embraer, its competitive strategy is supported
by competences in the technological domain,
management of complex projects and supply chain
management. The decision to become a major
supplier of regional aircraft in China required them
to install a subsidiary in China due to local
procurement procedures.
Each of these cases reflects firm-specific skills,
rather than country-specific (i.e. Brazil-specific)
skills. Notwithstanding, they indicate the high
competitive potential of leading Brazilian firms,
which are capable of producing in any country,
including China.
Chinese initiatives in Brazil
Chinese firms are investing in Brazil on two fronts.
The first is a government-brokered partnership in
which China and Brazil will make joint investments
in large infrastructural projects located mainly in the
north-east of Brazil. Four of these were discussed
between the two governments during official visits
and will involve gas-extraction, a petrochemical
refinery, a steel plant and an alumina plant. Together
they involve a total cost of US$7.9bn. However, more
than a year has passed since these discussions, and
no progress has been observed. Brazilian authorities
complain about the lack of experience of the Chinese
partners and their inexperience about Brazil and
Latin America in general, but that might be only part
of the story (Valor, 15 September 2005: A5).
The second front involves direct investments as
a result of independent private sector decisions. To
date, there are no Chinese subsidiaries in Brazil.
But at least two large Chinese manufacturers are in
the process of assessing the feasibility of specific
investments. These are TCL, a producer of
consumer’s electronics, and Huawei, one of the
Chinese national champions in the area of
telecommunications equipment which has a
growing global presence (including as a supplier
of sophisticated telecommunications equipment
in Europe). 
4 Discussion and conclusions
The first point to stress is that the rise of China and
India is already influencing the trajectory of the
Brazilian economy, especially in terms of
participation in the world’s markets. There are strong
reasons to believe that the influence will become
more pronounced in the future. 
Even though Chinese and Brazilian strengths in
terms of industry might appear complementary,
the effects this has in reinforcing the basic
commodities-producing sectors create difficulties
for the more value-adding types of industry.
Although not considered in this article, the Indian
industrial economy has a similar profile to that of
Brazil, for example in software and metal-
mechanics, and this might create other types of
competition in the future. 
With regard to the growing external presence of
Brazilian and Chinese firms as producers in external
markets, there is a contrast in perspectives between
the two countries. In Brazil, public institutions are
still ambivalent, if not suspicious, about the
significance and impact of the internationalisation
of Brazilian enterprises. Will this outward expansion
mean that local investments will be reduced? Will
the local enterprises be creating jobs abroad while
destroying jobs domestically? By contrast, the
Chinese orientation towards external markets and
their influence upon global institutions and markets
seem to be much less equivocal. For example,
‘Chinese government agencies and companies are
undertaking all the required strategies in order to
promulgate unique technology standards and
influence over global standards’ (Deloitte 2004).
With regard to the Chinese multinationals, Child
and Rodrigues (2005 forthcoming) consider that
‘what precisely characterises the emerging
generation of Chinese internationalising firms is
their willingness to become path-creators in the
sense of moving away from crystallised social
practice, regulations or institutions by combining
innovative, proactive and risk-seeking behaviour’.
In this framework, ‘the dynamic capabilities
developed by those firms not only interact with
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their institutional legacy, but also play a direct role
in furthering their internationalisation’ (Child and
Rodrigues 2005 forthcoming).
If there is one lesson that must be learned from
the Brazilian case however, it is that the traditional
MNEs from the developed countries are already
playing a role and will continue to do so, thus
influencing the dynamics of the BRICS/BICS. There
is growing evidence that the process of revision and
restructuring of the long-established multinationals
from the advanced countries – the early movers –
is essentially to focus on highly value-adding
activities, and thus create the necessary conditions
to increase their command of global production
networks (Fleury and Fleury 2005). Therefore, the
future of the BRICS/BICS and their mutual
relationships will depend to a large extent on the
way in which that pattern takes shape through the
allocative, sourcing and locational decisions of these
MNEs. This is particularly important for economies
such as Brazil, in which foreign direct investment
has historically played such an important role.
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